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[297] 
Harris and Whole Woman’s Health Collide: No 
Funding Provisions Unduly Burden Reproductive 
Freedom 
ALISHA PATTON† 
This Note analyzes the pro-life crusade to defund Planned Parenthood and exclude private 
insurance plans that cover abortions from all subsidized insurance markets, ostensibly in 
accordance with decades-old case law that upheld the Hyde Amendment and other laws that 
prohibit Medicaid and Title X family planning program funds from being used to pay for 
abortions. That jurisprudence was based on two premises: (1) that governments have a 
legitimate interest in favoring live birth over abortion, and (2) that funding restrictions do not 
constitute unwarranted governmental interference with reproductive freedom because they do 
not impede abortion access but only disfavor it. While the truthfulness of those premises is 
debatable, this Note does not argue that old case law should be overturned. Rather, it argues 
that more recent case law is applicable to proposed No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion 
provisions, which go beyond simply denying government funds for abortions and are actually 
intended to undermine abortion rights by shutting down abortion providers and coercively 
forcing private insurers to drop abortion coverage as a standard feature of their health plans. 
Specifically, if enacted, these provisions should be subject to the undue burden standard laid out 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. Further, this Note concludes that the No Taxpayer 
Funding for Abortion provisions should be deemed unconstitutional under the undue burden 
standard or, in the alternative, because they violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
  
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Notes Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. I choose to dedicate this Note to all those who had to make the so-called “choice” between 
having an abortion or carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term, and to those who had no “choice.” Many thanks 
to Professor Jennifer Templeton Dunn and to Stephanie Toti for their guidance and encouragement in writing 
this Note and to If/When/How, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and the Center on Reproductive Rights and 
Justice for their tireless work on behalf of women everywhere and for believing in this Note when it was still in 
an early, unpolished state. I would also like to thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work 
and dedication in bringing this Note to print. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life 
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.”1 To that point, the latest findings of a longitudinal “Turnaway Study” 
found that women forced to carry unwanted pregnancies to term are nearly four 
times more likely to live below the federal poverty level than women who are 
able to access abortion care.2 Moreover, the aggregate effects of restrictions that 
prevent women from accessing birth control and abortion care weaken the 
 
 1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
Indeed, widespread access to contraceptives and abortion care has opened up educational and career 
opportunities for women, and is responsible for one-third to one-half of women’s wage gains relative to men 
since the 1960s. Compare Martha J. Bailey et al., The Opt-In Revolution? Contraception and the Gender Gap 
in Wages, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 225, 227 (2012) (crediting one-third to one-half of women’s wage 
gains relative to men since the 1960s to contraceptive access), with Kelli Garcia, Hostile to Women, Hostile to 
Abortion: The Wage Gap and Abortion Restrictions, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Apr. 14, 2015) 
https://nwlc.org/blog/hostile-women-hostile-abortion-wage-gap-and-abortion-restrictions (finding that 
seven out of ten of the states with the worst wage gaps have six or more abortion restrictions). 
 2. Diana Greene Foster et al., Socioeconomic Outcomes of Women Who Receive and Women Who Are 
Denied Wanted Abortions in the United States, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 407, 410–11 (2018). 
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national economy by instigating reductions in full-time employment, increases 
in single-parent households and reliance on public assistance.3 Thus, the federal 
government has a stake in helping women avoid unintended pregnancies and 
ensuring adequate access to abortion services. 
But, the current administration espouses “pro-life” values4 and has 
embedded several anti-abortion provisions into numerous Obamacare5 
replacement plan proposals. For example, the American Health Care Act 
(AHCA), which was passed by the United States House of Representatives (“the 
House”) on May 4, 2017, contained provisions that would (1) disqualify any 
Planned Parenthood clinic that continues to provide abortion services from 
receiving federal grants and reimbursements for providing family planning and 
other preventative healthcare services, excluding abortion care,6 and (2) ban 
insurance plans that offer abortion coverage as a standard feature from all 
subsidized markets.7 
These provisions were appropriated from an earlier failed budget 
reconciliation act that passed in the House but ultimately died on the Senate 
floor.8 The AHCA and each of the other proposed healthcare reform bills seem 
to have suffered the same fate, but the prolific and enduring nature of the so-
called No Funding provisions demonstrates the pro-life movement’s undying 
desire to see those provisions enacted. If enacted, the No Funding provisions 
would most likely debilitate Planned Parenthood—the nation’s largest abortion 
 
 3. Id. at 411. Indeed, it is estimated that for every $1 invested in family planning programs, federal and 
state governments save $7.09 in welfare funding. Jennifer J. Frost et al., Return on Investment: A Fuller 
Assessment of the Benefits and Cost Savings of the US Publicly Funded Family Planning Program, 92 MILBANK 
Q. 667, 696 (2014). 
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump, Presidential Candidate, to “Pro-Life Leader” (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.sba-list.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Trump-Letter-on-ProLife-Coalition.pdf (“I am writing to 
invite you to join my campaign’s Pro-Life Coalition . . . .”). 
 5. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)), which is often called the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) or Obamacare, was signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. The term 
“Obamacare” was first used by opponents of the legislation, but was subsequently appropriated by supporters 
and was eventually used by President Obama himself. Gregory Wallace, ‘Obamacare’: The Word that Defined 
the Health Care Debate, CNN (June 25, 2012, 1:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/25/politics/obamacare-
word-debate. 
 6. See American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017) (“[N]o Federal funds . . . 
may be made available . . . for payments to a prohibited entity” and further expressing that a prohibited entity is 
one that, inter alia, provides abortions other than those necessary to save the life of the mother or to terminate 
pregnancies that “result from an act of rape or incest.”). Not only does Planned Parenthood fall within the bill’s 
definition of “prohibited entity,” it is the only entity that falls within the definition. H.R. REP. NO. 115–52, at 59 
(2017) (“[O]nly Planned Parenthood . . . would be affected.”).  
 7. See H.R. 1628 §§ 202–03 (“The term ‘qualified health plan’ does not include any health plan that 
includes coverage for abortions (other than any abortion necessary to save the life of the mother or any abortion 
with respect to a pregnancy that is the result of an act of rape or incest.”). 
 8. Compare American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017), with No Taxpayer 
Funding for Abortion Act, H.R. 3, 112th Cong. (2011). Another reconciliation act containing the No Funding 
provisions was also pending enactment concurrently with the AHCA, but it too died on the Senate floor. See No 
Taxpayer Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act of 2017, H.R. 7, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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provider—financially, thereby impeding abortion access.9 Additionally, they 
would coerce private insurers to stop offering abortion coverage as a standard 
plan feature, making it harder to find and purchase abortion coverage. This Note 
argues that the described No Funding provisions or any provisions similarly 
designed to defund Planned Parenthood and/or force insurance plans that offer 
abortion coverage as a standard plan feature out of the subsidized insurance 
market would unjustifiably infringe on reproductive freedom. Proponents of 
such provisions argue, paradoxically, that the provisions do not infringe on 
reproductive freedom because they do not prohibit or restrict abortion access, 
but simply deny public funding for abortions in accordance with case law that 
sustains governments’ right to favor live birth over abortion. 
To fully understand and appreciate the tensions between the constitutional 
right to terminate a pregnancy and governments’ right to refuse to pay for 
abortions, a bit of background is in order. Thus, Part I will discuss the history of 
funding restrictions in the context of the abortion wars before arguments against 
the No Funding provisions are made in Part II. Subpart II.A argues that the No 
Funding provisions would unduly burden both abortion and contraceptive 
access. Subpart II.B argues that, even if the No Funding provisions are viewed 
as mere funding restriction that do not burden abortion access, they violate the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
I.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. THE RISE OF FUNDING RESTRICTIONS AS A PROXY FOR OVERTURNING 
ROE 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court held that the fundamental right 
to privacy “encompass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”10 However, just four years later, Congress passed the Hyde 
Amendment, which prohibits federal dollars from being used to fund abortions, 
with just a few exceptions.11 The amendment’s leading sponsor, Republican 
Congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois, was frank about the amendment’s purpose 
of hindering abortion access from the very beginning. During a congressional 
debate on the proposed bill, he explained the significance of the amendment, 
stating, “I certainly would like to prevent . . . anybody [from] having an 
 
 9. See discussion infra Subpart II.A.1. 
 10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 11. Hyde Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460 (1977). The Hyde 
Amendment prohibited federal dollars from being used to fund abortions “except where the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term” from 1981 until 1993. Hyde Amendment of 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 101–166, 103 Stat. 1159, 1177 (1989). In 1993 the Hyde Amendment was modified to also authorize 
federal funding for abortions that result from rape or incest. Hyde Amendment of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–112, 
107 Stat. 1082, 1113 (1993). For an analysis of the inadequacy of these exceptions, see Stephanie Poggi, 
Abortion Funding for Poor Women: The Myth of the Rape Exception, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 28, 2005, 
9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2005/04/28/1427/abortion-funding-for-
poor-women-the-myth-of-the-rape-exception/. 
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abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, 
the only vehicle available is the . . . Medicaid bill.”12 
On June 30, 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases 
which upheld the constitutionality of both the Hyde Amendment and analogous 
state versions of the Hyde Amendment.13 The Court declared, in Harris v. 
McRae, that the Constitution protects against unwarranted government 
interference with freedom of choice in the context of abortion, but that “it does 
not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the 
advantages of that freedom.”14 Thus, the Court drew a line in the sand. On one 
hand, women have a fundamental right to choose to terminate pregnancy prior 
to viability and neither the federal or state governments may not prevent them 
from doing so. However, governments are not required to ensure that women are 
actually able to procure abortion services. In other words, governments do not 
have to pay for abortion services. 
In the wake of the Court’s decision to uphold the Hyde Amendment, thirty-
four states and the district of Columbia have enacted analogous statutes that 
prohibit state dollars from being used to fund abortions.15 Statutes in twenty-
seven of those states directly parallel the Hyde Amendment, prohibiting state 
dollars from being used to fund abortions except those necessary to save the life 
of the mother or arising out of rape or incest.16 Seven states carved out 
additional, but limited exceptions: Indiana, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 
extend coverage to “abortions necessary to avoid grave, long-lasting damage to 
the woman’s physical health,” and Iowa, Mississippi, Virginia, and West 
Virginia cover abortions related to fetal impairment.17 In contrast, South 
Dakota’s statute limits abortion coverage beyond the restrictions of the Hyde 
Amendment by prohibiting state funds from being used to cover abortions that 
 
 12. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the 
United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 12 (2007) (third alteration in original) (quoting House 
Representative Henry Hyde). 
 13. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (involving various constitutional challenges to the 
Hyde Amendment and the assertion that certain provisions of the Social Security Act required states participating 
in the Medicaid program to fund all medically necessary abortions, even if federal reimbursement was 
unavailable); see also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980) (equal protection challenge to an Illinois 
statute that prohibited state medical assistance payments for abortions that weren’t necessary to save the life of 
the mother). State interpretations of what “necessary to save the life of the mother” means vary widely; for an 
interesting (and heartbreaking) story about Florida’s very narrow interpretation of the exception, see NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE HYDE AMENDMENT CREATES AN UNACCEPTABLE BARRIER TO WOMEN GETTING 
ABORTIONS 1 (2017), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Hyde-
Amendment.pdf (“Medicaid refused to cover the abortion of a woman with cancer who needed chemotherapy 
but could not receive treatment because she was pregnant. Although delaying chemotherapy would likely cause 
her death, [her] death was not considered ‘imminent,’ so her case did not fit within the narrow life exception.”).  
 14. 448 U.S. at 317–18. 
 15. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST., (Nov. 16, 2018) 
https://www.guttmacher.org/print/state-policy/explore/state-funding-abortion-under-medicaid [hereinafter State 
Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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arise out of rape or incest.18 Thus, women living in thirty-four of our nation’s 
fifty states generally cannot obtain any state or federal assistance with abortion 
costs. 
Of course, the Hyde Amendment and state versions of the Hyde 
Amendment have a disparate impact on the poor, particularly women of color.19 
Under Roe-Harris treatment of abortion rights, abortion rights of the affluent are 
protected, but governments are allowed “to interfere with the reproductive 
decisions of the poor.”20 In fact, lack of funding is the number one barrier to 
abortion access, forcing one in four low-income women who would elect to have 
an abortion but for financial barriers to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.21 
Thus, Henry Hyde’s amendment is doing exactly what he wanted it to do, 
serving as a powerful “proxy for overturning Roe.”22 As Justice Brennan 
declared in his Harris dissent, “the Hyde Amendment is nothing less than an 
attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and achieve 
indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not do directly.”23 
The California Supreme Court echoed Justice Brennan’s sentiments in 
striking down a California version of the Hyde Amendment, stating that the 
benefits of the funding restrictions did not “manifestly outweigh the impairment 
of the constitutional rights” because the economic advantages of the restrictions 
were “illusory” and the proffered state interest in protecting fetal life did not 
overshadow women’s fundamental right to terminate pregnancy.24 The court 
further opined that the State’s objective could have been achieved by alternative 
means “less offensive” to the reproductive choice.25 California’s Supreme Court 
does not stand alone in its rebellion against Harris; nine other states have 
 
 18. See Boonstra, supra note 12, at 13; see also State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, supra note 15. 
What’s up with South Dakota? This is just the tip of the iceberg with respect to the state’s assault on abortion 
rights—there is only one abortion clinic in the entire state, the Sioux Falls Planned Parenthood clinic, and the 
state requires women seeking abortion care to obtain state-directed counseling that includes information 
designed to discourage them from having abortions, and then wait seventy-two hours before the procedure is 
provided (the longest waiting period in the country), thereby necessitating two trips to the facility. See Blair 
Hickman, What It Takes to Get an Abortion in South Dakota, JEZEBEL (Apr. 15, 2011, 1:05 PM), 
https://jezebel.com/5792156/what-it-takes-to-get-an-abortion-in-south-dakota. 
 19. See Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture, 11 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 
2, 4 (2008). “Minority women, women who are poor and women with little education are more likely than 
women overall to report dissatisfaction with either their contraceptive method or provider.” Id. That 
dissatisfaction leads to inconsistent contraceptive use and unintended pregnancies. Id. Moreover, “[c]ultural and 
linguistic barriers also can contribute to difficulties in [consistent and effective use of birth control].” Id. In fact, 
“[i]n the United States, the abortion rate for black women is almost five times that for white women . . . [and] 
[t]he abortion rate among Hispanic women . . . is double the rate among whites.” Id.  
 20. Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A Travesty of Justice: Revisiting Harris v. McRae, 21 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & LAW 5, 6 (2014). 
 21. Restricting Medicaid Funding for Abortion Forces One in Four Poor Women to Carry Unwanted 
Pregnancies to Term, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 7, 2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/print/news-
release/2009/restricting-medicaid-funding-abortion-forces-one-four-poor-women-carry-unwanted. 
 22. Boonstra, supra note 12, at 12.  
 23. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 331 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 24. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 781 (Cal. 1981). 
 25. Id. at 786. 
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policies that direct their Medicaid programs to pay for all or most medically 
necessary abortions pursuant to court orders.26 Additionally, five states have 
voluntarily instituted such policies.27 
B. THE FUNGIBILITY PRINCIPLE AS A BASIS FOR EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE 
FUNDING RESTRICTIONS UPHELD IN HARRIS 
Although the Hyde Amendment and analogous state statutes generally 
prohibit government dollars from being used to fund abortions directly, the pro-
life movement asserts that subsidizing persons and entities that use their own 
funds for abortion-related activities is indirectly supporting abortion because 
money is fungible.28 This notion—the fungibility principle—underlies the No 
Funding provisions, which are ostensibly intended to (1) prevent government 
legitimization of abortion, and (2) protect taxpayers who are morally opposed to 
abortion from having to subsidize the procedure. 
The fungibility principle posits that every tax dollar given to Planned 
Parenthood for contraceptive and other preventative health services through 
Medicaid or Title X of the Public Health Service Act29 frees up a private dollar, 
 
 26. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, supra note 15. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Vermont. Id.  
 27. Id. (identifying Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Washington as having voluntary pay 
policies). 
 28. Joerg Dreweke, “Fungibility”: The Argument at the Center of a 40-Year Campaign to Undermine 
Reproductive Health and Rights, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 53, 53 (2016); Susan A. Cohen, What’s Behind 
the Antiabortion Campaign over ‘Fungibility’?, 1 GUTTMACHER PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 1–2 (1998). 
 29. Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300 (2012), authorizes the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to 
make grants to and enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the 
establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of 
acceptable and effective family planning methods and services (including natural family planning 
methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents.  
42 U.S.C. § 303(a). Title X programs are crucial to low income populations. See C.I. FOWLER ET AL., TITLE X 
FAMILY PLANNING ANNUAL REPORT: 2016 NATIONAL SUMMARY, at ES-1 (2017), https://www.hhs.gov/opa/
sites/default/files/title-x-fpar-2016-national.pdf (“The Title X National Family Planning Program . . . is the only 
federal program dedicated solely to supporting the delivery of family planning and related preventive health 
care. The program is designed to provide contraceptive supplies and information to all who want and need them, 
with priority given to persons from low-income families.” (emphasis added)). In fact, “[f]or many clients, Title 
X providers are their only ongoing source of health care and health education.” Id. Although the provision of 
abortion services seemingly aligns with the primary purpose of Title X, Title X funds cannot be used to pay for 
abortions except under very limited circumstances. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2017) (the purpose of Title X is to 
provide the “educational, comprehensive medical, and social services necessary to aid individuals to determine 
freely the number and spacing of their children”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (providing that none of the funds 
appropriated under Title X “shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning”). Indeed, 
it was 
the intent of both Houses that funds authorized under this legislation be used only to support 
preventive family planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related 
medical, informational, and educational activities. The conferees have adopted the language 
contained in section 1008, which prohibits the use of such funds for abortion, in order to make clear 
this intent. 
116 CONG. REC. 39,873 (1970). Subsequent Congresses have reiterated this requirement through annual 
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which then becomes available to cover the costs of abortion services or advance 
Planned Parenthood’s abortion rights agenda.30 Similarly, under the fungibility 
principle, subsidizing insurance plans that offer abortion coverage as a standard 
feature is subsidizing abortion and should be viewed as governmental 
endorsement of the procedure. While counterarguments to the fungibility 
principle will be taken up in Part II, the following sections will focus only on 
how abortion rights opponents are using the fungibility principle to justify 
attempts to expand the reach of Harris. 
1. The Movement to Defund Planned Parenthood 
The earliest calls to defund Planned Parenthood were based on “open 
hostility to contraception” and concerns about “non-marital, non-reproductive 
sex.”31 However, modern calls to defund Planned Parenthood are predominantly 
centered around the organization’s status as a major player in the abortion 
wars—Planned Parenthood is the nation’s largest provider of abortions and an 
earnest litigant in efforts to expand abortion rights.32 Given the organization’s 
emphasis on abortion rights, antiabortion activists assert that transferring 
government funds to Planned Parenthood should be viewed as government 
sponsorship of abortion advocacy. In this context, the fungibility principle has 
nothing to do with how Planned Parenthood spends government funds and 
“everything to do with how they spend their own.”33 
But the scope of Planned Parenthood’s practice does not provide a 
sufficient basis for exempting it from participating in federally funded family 
planning programs.34 Medicaid law entitles Medicaid beneficiaries to a right to 
receive healthcare services from “any . . . organization that is (i) Qualified to 
furnish the services; and (ii) Willing to furnish them to that particular 
beneficiary.”35 At the same time, the regulations allow States to set “reasonable 
 
appropriations provisos, stating “amounts provided to said projects, under such title shall not be expended for 
abortions . . . .” See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018); 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2016).  
 30. See Mary Ziegler, Sexing Harris: The Law and Politics of the Movement to Defund Planned 
Parenthood, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 704 (2012) (“The defunding movement works to expand . . . the fungibility 
principle: the idea that money offered to any abortion provider for any service offsets other expenses, frees up 
funds for abortion, and thus constitutes money for abortion.”); see also Cohen, supra note 28, at 1.  
 31. Ziegler, supra note 30, at 702. However, “open hostility to contraception” is not extinct; modern anti-
contraception zealots assert that contraceptives are abortifacients and harmful to women’s health. Id. at 702, 
714, 719. For example, Katy French Talento, a member of the White House’s Domestic Policy Council, claims 
that “chemical birth control” is “causing miscarriages of already-conceived children” and “breaking your uterus 
for good.” Katy French Talento, Miscarriage of Justice: Is Big Pharma Breaking Your Uterus?, FEDERALIST 
(Jan. 22, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/01/22/miscarriage-of-justice-is-big-pharma-breaking-your-uterus. 
 32. See Ziegler, supra note 30, at 716. 
 33. Cohen, supra note 28, at 1. 
 34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 10–19, Planned Parenthood of 
Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Health Dep’t, 699 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2464). 
 35. 42 C.F.R. § 431.51(b)(1) (2017); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2012). 
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standards relating to the qualifications of providers.”36 This has emboldened the 
pro-life movement to dispute Planned Parenthood’s qualifications, calling 
Planned Parenthood an “abortion business”37 and asserting that women’s health 
would be better served at “community health centers that provide comprehensive 
health care for women.”38 
Despite the Medicaid Act’s “free choice of providers”39 requirement, 
seventeen state legislatures have adopted or proposed legislation that excludes 
Planned Parenthood from participation in federally funded family planning 
programs, hoping these laws will be upheld as mere funding restrictions.40 But 
interpreting Harris to allow medically qualified providers to be exempted from 
receiving funding for family planning services simply because they also provide 
abortion care would surely be an expansion of government’s right to favor live 
birth over abortion.41 
However, the pro-life movement has made the funding issue about gender 
equality as well, asserting that women, especially poor women of color, need to 
be protected from increasing social pressures to choose abortion over 
childbirth.42 “[T]he defunding movement draws on longstanding feminist 
anxieties about the power dynamics of heterosexual sexual 
relationships. . . .[and holds] that Planned Parenthood aids and abets men who 
use women for sex by removing pregnancy as a consequence of wrongdoing.”43 
 
 36. 42 C.F.R. § 431.51(c)(2). 
 37. See, e.g., Press Release, Majorie Dannenfelser, President, Susan B. Anthony List, SBA List Celebrates 
House Passage of Health Care Bill with Two Critical Pro-life Provisions (May 4, 2017), https://www.sba-
list.org/newsroom/press-releases/sba-list-celebrates-house-passage-health-care-bill-two-critical-pro-life-
provisions. 
 38. E.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump, supra note 4. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2012). 
 40. Medicaid Family Planning Eligibility Expansions, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2018) 
https://www.guttmacher.org/print/state-policy/explore/medicaid-family-planning-eligibility-expansions. For 
example, Indiana enacted a statute prohibiting state agencies from contracting with or making grants to “any 
entity that performs abortions or maintains or operates a facility where abortions are performed that involves the 
expenditure of state funds or federal funds administered by the state.” IND. CODE § 5-22-17-5.5(b)(2) (2018). 
Immediately after this statute was enacted, Planned Parenthood filed a lawsuit seeking to block its 
implementation claiming that the statute violated the Medicaid Act’s “free choice of provider” provision; 
injunctive relief was granted. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Health Dep’t, 699 
F.3d 962, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2012). However, the House Committee on the Budget recently proposed a budget 
that “supports the long-standing policy to ban federal taxpayer dollars from funding elective abortions and calls 
for a 10-year cessation of federal funding for Planned Parenthood.” H.R. REP. NO. 115–816, at 72 (2018). It, 
similarly, preached that “[t]he federal government should not force states to provide funding to clinics such as 
Planned Parenthood that perform elective abortions. . . . [and] should not force taxpayers to fund those clinics.” 
Id. It seems likely that a Supreme Court ruling on this issue would be unfavorable to Planned Parenthood. See 
Dylan Scott, John Roberts Is the Supreme Court’s New Swing Vote. Is He Going to Overturn Roe v. Wade?, 
VOX (July 9, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/9/17541954/roe-v-wade-
supreme-court-john-roberts.  
 41. See Ziegler, supra note 30, at 703 (“[T]he movement represents [] an effort to redefine and expand the 
limits on the abortion right set forth in . . . Harris v. McRae, the case that upheld the Hyde Amendment, a ban 
on the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion services.”). 
 42. Id. at 704. 
 43. Id. at 705–06. 
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Moreover, husbands and other would-be fathers, pimps, parents of teenage 
girls who become pregnant, and even physicians and counselors at abortion 
clinics ostensibly coerce and threaten pregnant girls and women into having 
abortions. “Her ‘choice’ can include loss of home, income and family, or 
violence and even murder,” abortion opponents say.44 Thus, the pro-life 
movement asserts that the availability of abortion services doesn’t allow for an 
option to choose abortion; it creates an obligation to have an abortion.45 
Given this spin on the provision of abortion services, the pro-life movement 
alleges that funding Planned Parenthood does not advance reproductive 
freedom. Rather, it contravenes that freedom and is harmful to women’s health. 
But notions that women are generally relegated to submissive roles within 
heterosexual relationships and/or are susceptible to coercion merely because 
they are of the so-called weaker sex are antiquated.46 
Moreover, laws that defund abortion clinics as a means of protecting 
subjugated women who may be particularly vulnerable to forced or coerced 
abortions are both overbroad and under-inclusive. They are overbroad because 
they impede abortion access for all women, including those who reach the 
decision to have an abortion without any undue influence. At the same time, the 
laws are seriously under-inclusive, because they do not protect women who have 
the means to pay for abortion (or whose coercer is willing and able to pay for 
the abortion) from being subjected to forced or coerced abortions. Indeed, laws 
that require abortion providers to identify and provide special counseling or 
other services to patients who may have been unduly influenced to schedule an 
abortion appointment would better address the issue of forced or coerced 
abortions. Moreover, such laws would better serve women’s health by 
identifying women in abusive relationships and connecting them with agencies 
that can provide appropriate social services. 
2. Demands to Prohibit the Subsidization of Abortion Care 
While Planned Parenthood has been fighting defunding threats for decades, 
the 2010 implementation of state and federal marketplaces has provided a new 
 
 44. Forced Abortion in America: Coercion Can Escalate to Violence, Even Murder, ELLIOTT INST., 
http://www.theunchoice.com/pdf/FactSheets/ForcedAbortion FactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (opining that the 
notion that women need statutory protection to prevent them from making a decision they will come to forget 
“reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that have long 
since been discredited”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542 n.12 (1996) (opining that a 
government interest must not rely on “overbroad generalizations about the talents, capacities, or preferences” of 
women as “[s]uch judgments have attended, and impeded, women’s progress toward full citizenship stature 
throughout our Nation’s history”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (plurality opinion) (opinion 
of Brennan, J.) (rejecting a gender-based Social Security classification because it rested on “‘archaic and 
overbroad’ generalizations ‘such as assumptions as to [women’s] dependency’ [on their husbands] that are more 
consistent with ‘the role-typing society has long imposed,’ than with contemporary reality” (first quoting 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975); then quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); 
and then quoting Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975))). 
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avenue for attempts to expand the funding restrictions upheld in Harris. 
Marketplaces provide a convenient forum where individuals who have too much 
income to qualify for Medicaid can purchase insurance plans that are subsidized 
by the federal government.47 While people with incomes below one hundred and 
thirty-eight percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) qualify for no-cost 
insurance through the Medicaid expansion, those with incomes up to four 
hundred percent of the FPL48 only receive refundable premium tax credits when 
they purchase health insurance plans through the federal or state marketplaces.49 
Yet another advantage of purchasing insurance through a marketplace is 
that the federal government makes advance payments of the premium tax credit 
directly to eligible individuals’ insurance companies, thereby lowering out-of-
pocket costs for health care premiums.50 Many people would not be able to 
purchase health insurance in the absence of such an arrangement.51 
But, under current law, states are allowed to prohibit all health plans in 
their marketplaces from offering abortion coverage as a standard feature.52 
States may also ban such coverage in all state-regulated private plans.53 This 
unfortunate arrangement was the result of a concession made by former 
President Barack Obama, which was necessary to get the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) enacted.54 As of September 21, 2017, 
twenty-five states have laws that limit or ban abortion coverage in their 
marketplaces, and eleven of those states also ban abortion coverage in the 
private insurance markets.55 
 
 47. A Quick Guide to the Health Insurance Marketplace: 5 Tips About the Health Insurance Marketplace, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/quick-guide/one-page-guide-to-the-marketplace (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2018). 
 48. 2018 Federal Poverty Level, OBAMACARE.NET, https://obamacare.net/2018-federal-poverty-level (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018). Below is an excerpt of the 2018 Federal Poverty Level Income Bracket Chart: 
 
Family Size 100% of FPL 400% of FPL 
                         1                   $12,060                   $48,240 
                         2                   $16,240                   $64,960 
                         3                   $20,420                   $81,680 
                         4                   $24,600                   $98,400 
Id. 
 49. Cynthia Cox et al., How Affordable Care Act Repeal and Replace Plans Might Shift Health Insurance 
Tax Credits, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-
brief/how-affordable-care-act-repeal-and-replace-plans-might-shift-health-insurance-tax-credits. 
 50. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, Pub. No. 974, Premium Tax Credit (PTC) (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p974.pdf. 
 51. See Cox et al., supra note 49. 
 52. See Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010) (“The [ACA] maintains current Hyde 
Amendment restrictions governing abortion policy and extends those restrictions to the newly created health 
insurance exchanges.”). 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Rebecca Adams, The Question of Abortion Coverage in Health Exchanges, ROLL CALL (July 22, 
2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/the_question_of_abortion_coverage_in_health_exchanges-
226547-1.html. 
 55. Interactive: How State Policies Shape Access to Abortion Coverage, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.kff.org/interactive/abortion-coverage. 
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Texas recently passed a bill that bans non-emergent abortion coverage in 
both its marketplace and its private insurance market.56 The law makes no 
exceptions for the termination of pregnancies arising out of rape or incest or 
instances of fetal abnormalities.57 Instead, it requires women to purchase an 
abortion “rider”—an optional policy add-on—if they want “elective abortion” 
coverage.58 The lively floor debates had over the bill in Texas’s House of 
Representatives demonstrate the controversial nature of such laws and are 
helpful in understanding fungibility principle-based arguments for and against 
demands to prohibit the subsidization of abortion services. 
Chris Turner, a Texas Democratic Representative, has dubbed the 
additional insurance premium required for the coverage of non-emergent 
abortions “rape insurance” and denounces the Texas law, stating: 
Women don’t plan to be raped. Parents don’t plan for their children to be victims 
of incest, . . . Asking a woman or a parent to foresee something like that and buy 
supplemental insurance to cover that horrific possibility is not only ridiculous, it 
is cruel.59 
The emotional appeal of Representative Turner’s statement is palpable, 
but, in all fairness, all insurance policies are taken out in anticipation of the 
worst. And Turner hasn’t done the abortion rights movement any favors—his 
statement disparages only the resolve not to include an exception for pregnancies 
arising out of rape or incest, arguably undermining the legitimacy of other 
reasons for choosing to terminate a pregnancy. 
And just as the poor are more heavily burdened by the Hyde Amendment, 
poor Texans will suffer the consequences of the Texas law in greater numbers, 
many of them having to carry unwanted pregnancies to term. Of course, there 
are exceptions to every rule—desperate women may resort to objectionable 
means of raising the funds necessary to obtain lawful abortions. In Women’s 
Health Services, Inc. v. Maher, the court noted that some particularly assiduous 
women were able to finance abortions by: 
[N]ot paying rent or utility bills, pawning household goods, diverting food and 
clothing money, or journeying to another state to obtain lower rates or 
fraudulently use a relative’s insurance policy. In a few cases, patients were [even] 
driven to theft.60 
 
 56. H.B. 214, 85th Gen. Assemb., 1st Called Sess. (Tex. 2017) (enacted). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at § 169.001(b); see also Caroline Rosenzweig et al., Abortion Riders: Women Living in States with 
Insurance Restrictions Lack Abortion Coverage Options, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., at 3 (2018), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Data-Note-Abortion-Riders-Women-Living-in-States-with-Insurance-
Restrictions-Lack-Abortion-Coverage-Options (“A health insurance rider is a limited scope supplemental 
benefit policy that covers certain services, such as dental and vision benefits, which are not included in a standard 
health insurance plan.”). 
 59. Shannon Najmabadi, Abbott Signs Bill Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 
15, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/15/abbott-signs-bill-restricting-insurance-
coverage-abortion (quoting Texas Representative Chris Turner). 
 60. Women’s Health Servs., Inc. v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 731 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), vacated, 636 F.2d 
23 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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But proponents of the Texas law contend that “[t]his isn’t about who can 
get an abortion. It is about who is forced to pay for an abortion.”61 This sentiment 
was echoed by Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who signed the bill stating: 
As a firm believer in Texas values, I am proud to sign legislation that ensures no 
Texan is ever required to pay for a procedure that ends the life of an unborn 
child . . . This bill prohibits insurance providers from forcing Texas policy 
holders to subsidize elective abortions. I am grateful to the Texas legislature for 
getting this bill to my desk, and working to protect innocent life this special 
session.62 
Thus, the fungibility principle is the underlying justification for the Texas 
law and, in theory, abortion seekers in Texas can still purchase abortion riders. 
However, it is unclear whether insurance providers will even offer abortion 
riders in Texas. After all, abortion riders have not been readily available in the 
ten other states that have banned the sale of policies that include abortion 
coverage as a standard feature from their private insurance markets.63 
The lack of available abortion riders creates a de facto prohibition on 
abortion coverage. After all, if abortion riders are not actually available to those 
who would seek to maintain abortion coverage, then there is no meaningful 
distinction between allowing the purchase of abortion riders and prohibiting 
individuals who purchase insurance plans through the Marketplace from 
purchasing separate coverage for abortions. For those who must purchase health 
insurance through the Marketplace in order to remain in compliance with the 
law, a de facto prohibition of abortion coverage results from banning plans that 
cover abortions from the subsidized markets. 
Taken to its logical extreme, the fungibility principle begins to crumble in 
the context of the abortion war. Even if abortion riders were available to those 
who would seek to maintain abortion coverage, a thorough application of the 
fungibility principle would necessitate prohibiting individuals who purchase 
insurance plans through the Marketplace from purchasing separate coverage for 
abortions in order to protect taxpayers from having to subsidize abortions. After 
all, subsidizing the costs of maintaining health insurance frees up money that 
 
 61. Najmabadi, supra note 59 (quoting Republican Texas Representative John Smithee). But how much 
does abortion coverage cost taxpayers?  
For insurers, the additional cost to provide abortion coverage as a benefit in a standard health policy 
is minimal. The actual cost of an abortion benefit for plans operating on the ACA Exchanges (where 
payments for abortion coverage are required to be segregated from the other services) was estimated 
to add between 11 and 33 cents per member per month (PMPM) in 2012, significantly less than the 
minimal additional premium charge for abortion coverage that is required by law, $1 PMPM. Insurers 
that include abortion coverage pay for abortion services for their policy holders, but the additional 
cost is minimal because it is spread over all enrollees.  
ROSENZWEIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
 62. Press Release, Greg Abbott, Governor of Tex., Off. of the Tex. Governor, Governor Abbott Signs Pro-
Life Insurance Reform (Aug. 15, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-signs-pro-life-
insurance-reform. 
 63. See ROSENZWEIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 1 (“In states that ban abortion coverage, riders are practically 
nonexistent, and [individual] policy holders have no option to obtain abortion coverage.”). 
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can then be used to purchase abortion riders. 
C. TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS AND THE 
CONCEPTION64 OF THE “UNDUE BURDEN” STANDARD 
Funding restrictions have not been the exclusive means of undercutting 
reproductive freedom. State governments have also enacted a plethora of anti-
abortion laws that, while not absolute bans on abortion, place unnecessary 
mandates or restrictions on abortion providers and facilities where abortions are 
provided.65 These laws, which have been dubbed “targeted regulations of 
abortion providers” or “TRAP laws,” are usually passed under the guise of 
promoting maternal health, but are actually intended to undermine the abortion 
right by shutting down abortion providers.66 TRAP laws are not unconstitutional 
per se but are scrutinized under the “undue burden” standard set out by the 
Supreme Court in a seminal 1992 case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey. 
Casey held that any law that places an “undue burden” on women’s right 
to terminate a pregnancy violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment in the case of a federal law and of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the case of a state law.67 A law places an undue burden on abortions right when 
it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”68 However, a law that was 
“not designed to strike at the [abortion] right” yet still has an “incidental effect 
of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for 
abortion or any other medical procedure,” should not be invalidated.69 
But Casey failed to explain exactly when a burden crosses the line from 
merely “incidental” to “undue.” And, because the Supreme Court upheld four of 
the five anti-abortion provisions examined in Casey, states came to believe that 
they were free to pass essentially any anti-abortion law that was not an outright 
prohibition of abortion and exercised little restraint in continuing to enact an 
abundance of new, post-Casey TRAP laws.70 This trend went largely unchecked 
until 2016 when the Supreme Court deemed two provisions of Texas’s House 
Bill 2 to constitute unnecessary and substantial obstacles to abortion access in 
 
 64. Pun intended. 
 65. See Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Providers—
and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 9, 10 (2014). 
 66. See id. (TRAP laws generally “dictate that abortions be performed at sites . . . [like] ambulatory surgical 
centers, or even hospitals, . . . [or] require clinicians at abortion facilities to have admitting privileges at a local 
hospital . . . effectively giving hospitals veto power over whether an abortion clinic can exist”) (citation 
omitted)). 
 67. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion) (opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 874. 
 70. See Boonstra & Nash, supra note 65, at 10 (“[A] startling number of states have passed harsh new 
restrictions. In 2011–2013, legislatures in 30 states enacted 205 abortion restrictions—more than the total 
number enacted in the entire previous decade.” (citation omitted)). 
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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.71 
Whole Woman’s Health contributed the following to the undue burden 
analysis: If a law’s enactment will not serve a legitimate government interest or 
if there is no evidence that the law will actually serve the government’s proffered 
interest, then any burden the law imposes on abortion access cannot be deemed 
merely “incidental” because the law is assumed to have been enacted solely to 
impede abortion access.72 Thus, Whole Woman’s Health provides a meaningful 
measure by which TRAP laws can be challenged—it requires governments to 
demonstrate a cognizable benefit derived from the enactment of any abortion 
regulation which advances a legitimate government interest. 
II.  ARGUMENTS 
A. THE NO FUNDING PROVISIONS UNDULY BURDEN ABORTION ACCESS 
All laws that infringe on abortion rights are subject to the “undue burden” 
standard. The undue burden analysis, laid out and applied in Casey and 
developed in Whole Woman’s Health, is a balancing test that weighs the 
government’s interest in enacting a law against the burden the law places on 
abortion access. The standard demands that any law that burdens abortion access 
must meet the following requirements: (1) the law must have a valid purpose, 
meaning that it was enacted to address a legitimate government interest and not 
just to impede abortion access, and (2) the law must not place “a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice” to have an abortion.73 
1. Application of the “Undue Burden” Standard to the Provision that 
Defunds Planned Parenthood 
 
PRONG 1—LEGITIMATE INTEREST 
 
Congress’ proffered interests in defunding Planned Parenthood are 1) to 
promote women’s health by reallocating funds to “community health centers 
that provide comprehensive health care for women,” and 2) to “protect [pro-life] 
taxpayers from having to pay for abortions.”74 The following Parts address the 
legitimacy of these interests, but it is worth noting that, even if the proffered 
 
 71. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 (2016). 
 72. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. 
 73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. The Hyde Amendment and analogous state statutes have not been invalidated 
by Casey and Whole Woman’s Health. I surmise that these statutes would likely pass the “undue burden” test. 
After all, the Harris decision (1) explicitly recognized a government interest in encouraging childbirth over 
abortion as a legitimate purpose for prohibiting government funds from being used to fund abortions directly, 
and (2) found that these statutes place “no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to 
terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, 
encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). It is 
almost as if the Harris decision was written with the undue burden standard in mind. 
 74. See, e.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump, supra note 4. 
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interests are not legitimate, Congress can always fall back on the classic 
“important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”75 
However, even this interest cannot justify the placement of an undue burden on 
women’s constitutional liberty interest, as exemplified in Whole Woman’s 
Health. 
A proffered interest cannot be deemed legitimate when there is no evidence 
that the law will serve that interest.76 In Whole Women’s Health, the Court 
considered two provisions of Texas’s House Bill 2.77 The first provision, an 
“admitting privileges requirement,” obligated all physicians providing abortion 
services to have admitting privileges at a hospital located within thirty miles 
from the place where the abortion was done.78 The second provision, the 
“surgical-center requirement,” required all abortion facilities to comply with a 
cumbersome list of specifications regarding the layout of those facilities and 
sterile procedures to be followed before, during, and after abortion procedures.79 
In justifying these provisions, the State claimed an interest in promoting 
maternal health.80 However, there was no evidence that these provisions would 
actually serve to promote maternal health, giving rise to a presumption that the 
provisions had been enacted for the sole purpose of undercutting the abortion 
right and were, therefore, unconstitutional.81 
Just as the healthcare regulations in Whole Woman’s Health did not 
advance the government’s proffered interest in protecting maternal health, 
neither would barring Planned Parenthood from receiving Medicaid and Title X 
grants and reimbursements for the provision of family planning services advance 
any of the government’s proffered interests in doing so. With respect to the 
interest in promoting women’s health, it seems that if community health centers 
really provide better, more comprehensive care than Planned Parenthood 
provides, then women would seek care from community health centers, and 
Medicaid and Title X reimbursements would follow without the need for 
government interference. However, women are choosing Planned Parenthood 
for their family planning and other preventative care services—this is the only 
reason why Planned Parenthood receives any government funding—and a 
provision that defunds Planned Parenthood would take that choice away, not 
provide new and better options. 
There is no evidence that Planned Parenthood provides substandard care or 
that women’s health would be promoted by the exclusion of Planned Parenthood 
from receiving government funds for the provision of family planning and other 
preventative care services.82 Thus, this proffered interest should be deemed 
 
 75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 76. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. 
 77. Id. at 2296. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2310. 
 81. Id.  
 82. The argument that defunding Planned Parenthood would promote women’s health is based on notions 
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illegitimate. 
Additionally, defunding Planned Parenthood would not serve Congress’ 
interest in protecting pro-life taxpayers from being forced to subsidize abortions. 
It would only keep taxpayers from having to subsidize family planning services, 
which help to prevent the need for abortion services. Similarly, excluding 
Planned Parenthood from receiving Title X grants and reimbursements for the 
provision of family planning services would not advance the government’s 
contingency interest in “protecting the potentiality of human life”83 because Title 
X funds are not used to pay for abortions. Thus, one would have to accept 
wholesale the fungibility argument to believe that defunding Planned 
Parenthood would actually serve the interests in protecting pro-life taxpayers 
from being forced to subsidize abortions or protecting the potentiality of human 
life. 
But critics of the fungibility principle as a justification for any policy based 
funding or defunding campaigns are quick to point out that all money is fungible, 
so any money given to an organization or to a citizen by the government could 
be said to subsidize any stigmatized or illegal activities that the organization or 
citizen chooses to engage in. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) illustrated this point 
in a Senate floor debate on the Foreign Affairs Reform Act, stating: 
Does that mean that because abortion is legal in Israel, . . . we should shut off 
U.S. aid to Israel because other Israeli government funds are used for 
abortion? . . .  
 Should we stop funding nuclear safety programs in Russia because abortion is 
legal there and . . . provided at government hospitals? . . . Maybe we should cut 
off aid to any state in the United States because abortion is legal [there].84 
Senator Leahy’s comment illustrates the slippery slope that the fungibility 
argument presents. And yet, any arguments that defunding Planned Parenthood 
would protect taxpayers or potential lives are completely dependent on the 
fungibility principle because Planned Parenthood is already prohibited from 
using government funds to pay for abortions. Thus, the No Funding provisions 
aimed at defunding Planned Parenthood are merely duplicative of the Hyde 
Amendment and analogous state statutes and, therefore, can be presumed to have 
been created solely for the purpose of impeding abortion rights. 
 
 
 
 
that the abortion experience is psychologically damaging to women; however, this notion has been discredited 
by numerous studies. See, e.g., BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK 
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 92 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/wpo/mental-health-abortion-
report.pdf (reviewing numerous studies on this topic and concluding that “the most methodologically sound 
research indicates that among women who have a single, legal, first-trimester abortion of an unplanned 
pregnancy for nontherapeutic reasons, the relative risks of mental health problems are no greater than the risks 
among women who deliver an unplanned pregnancy”).  
 83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 84. 144 CONG. REC. 6,732 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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PRONG 2—SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE 
 
Although Congress probably does not have a legitimate interest in 
provisions that bar funding to Planned Parenthood, there is no guarantee that the 
Supreme Court would reach that conclusion given the chance to review a federal 
or state No Funding provision. After all, the Supreme Court is shifting 
rightward.85 Moreover, there is a genuine concern that the Court will seek to 
 
 85. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme Court, Announces 
His Retirement, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-
kennedy-the-pivotal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retirement/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-5932-
11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html?utm_term=.c8e8c3c3ce6e (“An already right-leaning Supreme Court is 
poised to become the most conservative institution in the entire history of America’s government.” (quoting 
Thomas Goldstein, a Washington lawyer and the founder of SCOTUSblog.com)). In fact, with the recent 
addition of President Trump’s Supreme Court appointee, Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court’s conservative majority 
has been prevailing in recent ideologically charged cases. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. 
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Gorsuch, 
and Thomas forming the majority), overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that 
the First Amendment prohibits states from requiring non-union members to pay union dues that support the 
collective bargaining activities of the union); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (same majority) (holding 
that, with respect to immigration policy, the President’s actions are subject only to rational basis review). With 
respect to abortion rights, the Court’s conservative majority deemed California’s Reproductive Freedom, 
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) a likely burden on free speech in Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (same majority). The FACT Act requires 
unlicensed facilities that provide family planning services, often called “crisis pregnancy centers,” to: (1) notify 
patients that they are “not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and ha[ve] no licensed medical 
provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services,” and (2) post a sign stating that 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family 
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for 
eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the county social services office.” CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 123472 (West 2018). These disclosures are imperative: “crisis pregnancy centers” (which are 
both pro-life and pro-lie) often provide misinformation intended to discourage abortions and “look just like 
doctor’s offices with ultrasound rooms and staff in scrubs . . . [but] [u]nlike other mental-health providers, center 
counselors are generally not bound by professional standards or malpractice laws.” Meaghan Winter, What Some 
Pregnancy Centers Are Really Saying to Women with Unplanned Pregnancies, COSMOPOLITAN (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a43101/pregnancy-centers-august-2015. Moreover, it is not 
uncommon for medical providers to be required to make certain disclosures to patients; indeed, full disclosure 
is the basis of informed consent. As the Court said in Casey: “If the information the State requires to be made 
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.” 505 U.S. at 882 
(opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.) (emphasis added) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute that required 
abortion providers to give patients “information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child 
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to 
abortion,” id. at 881). Yet, the Becerra Court held that “the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech” by 
imposing “a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that [was] wholly disconnected from 
[California’s] informational interest.” 138 S. Ct. at 2377. To be clear, California’s informational interest was to 
prevent women from being tricked by religious anti-abortion centers masquerading as secular medical clinics by 
requiring those clinics to disclose their unlicensed status and inform women that they can access licensed 
healthcare providers and a range of family planning services. The FACT Act’s “government-scripted, speaker-
based disclosure requirement” seems to be very clearly directed at this goal. Thus, Casey and Becerra are as 
irreconcilable as Harris and Whole Woman’s Health in the context of No Funding provisions. As Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent in Becerra, “[i]f a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion 
about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a medical counselor to tell a woman 
seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?” Id. at 2385 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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constrain abortion rights or even overturn Roe in the upcoming term.86 Thus, the 
fungibility argument provides a plausible justification for recanting abortion 
rights. However, even if preventing the indirect subsidization of abortions is 
viewed as a legitimate government interest in defunding Planned Parenthood, 
such action would still be unduly burdensome if it placed “a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”87 
In considering the magnitude of the obstacle that defunding Planned 
Parenthood places in the path of women seeking abortions, it is important to note 
that Planned Parenthood is a keystone provider of family planning and abortion 
services, especially for the poor. “Despite comprising only 6% of the safety-net 
clinics that provided subsidized family planning services in 2015, Planned 
Parenthood clinics served 32% of women (nearly 2 million women) seeking 
contraceptive care at these centers.”88 Moreover, Planned Parenthood performs 
over one-third of all abortions in the United States89 (and fifty-one percent of 
women seeking abortion care live below the federal poverty level).90 But 
Planned Parenthood is dependent on federal grants and reimbursements, which 
make up thirty-seven percent of Planned Parenthood’s revenues.91 Thus, barring 
Planned Parenthood from receiving federal funds will directly burden both 
abortion and contraceptive access. 
 
 86. Trump’s newest Supreme Court appointee, Justice Brett Kavanagh, has been widely endorsed by the 
pro-life movement, which hopes he will be instrumental in overturning Roe. Ed Kilgore, Anti-Abortion Activists 
Have No Doubts About Kavanaugh, N.Y. MAG: INTELLIGENCER (July 20, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/07/anti-abortion-activists-are-sure-about-kavanaugh-to-scotus.html. 
(“[A]nti-abortion activists in Indiana hope that one of their laws, which gave a fetus nondiscrimination 
protections but was struck down in federal appeals court earlier this year, may be the one to challenge Roe v. 
Wade [sic]—if their attorney general appeals to the Supreme Court in the months ahead. But there are dozens of 
other cases working their way through the courts nationwide, including one involving an Iowa law banning 
almost all abortions after a fetal heartbeat is detected, and a Mississippi law banning abortion after 15 weeks.” 
(citation omitted) (alteration in original)). Even if the Court does not expressly overrule Roe, the abortion right 
is likely to be undermined in many states over the upcoming terms as the Court upholds state restrictions on 
abortion.  
 87. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). 
 88. USHA RANJI ET AL., TEN WAYS THAT THE HOUSE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT COULD AFFECT 
WOMEN 5 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Ten-Ways-That-the-House-American-Health-
Care-Act-Could-Affect-Women.  
 89. Compare Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United 
States, 2014, 49 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 17, 17 (2017) (“In 2014, an estimated 926,200 abortions 
were performed in the United States . . . .”), with PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED’N OF AM., 2014–2015 ANNUAL 
REPORT 30 (2015), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/2114/5089/0863/2014-
2015_PPFA_Annual_Report_.pdf [hereinafter PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2014–2015 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting 
that Planned Parenthood and its affiliates performed 323,999 of those abortions in 2014). 
 90. Foster et al., supra note 2, at 409. 
 91. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED’N OF AM., 2016–2017 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2017), 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/d4/50/d450c016-a6a9-4455-bf7f-711067db5ff7/ 
20171229_ar16-17_p01_lowres.pdf [hereinafter PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2016–2017 ANNUAL REPORT]. This 
number is down from the previous year’s figure of forty-one percent. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED’N OF AM., 
2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2016), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/ 
uploads/filer_public/18/40/1840b04b-55d3-4c00-959d11817023ffc8/20170526_annualreport_p02_singles.pdf 
[hereinafter PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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In fact, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which provides Congress 
with nonpartisan analysis of proposed legislation, estimates that defunding 
Planned Parenthood will negatively “affect services that help women avert 
pregnancies.”92 “By CBO’s estimates, in the one-year period in which federal 
funds for Planned Parenthood would be prohibited under the legislation, the 
number of births in the Medicaid program would increase by several thousand” 
as a result of the burden on contraceptive access.93 This report faintly 
acknowledges the important role that Planned Parenthood plays in preventing 
unintended pregnancies. 
Moreover, the CBO alluded to the fact that Planned Parenthood is a 
keystone healthcare provider in rural communities and for low-income women, 
stating “[t]he people most likely to experience reduced access to [contraceptive] 
care would probably reside in areas without other health care clinics or medical 
practitioners who serve low-income populations” and even estimated that “about 
15 percent of those people would lose access to care” entirely.94 
But barring Planned Parenthood from receiving government funds will 
burden abortion access as well. The threat to take away Planned Parenthood’s 
primary source of income will coerce Planned Parenthood to either stop 
performing abortions or else scramble to find another way to maintain eligibility 
for federal grants and reimbursements. Any solution that Planned Parenthood 
could come up with would burden abortion access, albeit to differing extents. 
The following sections detail Planned Parenthood’s apparent options (excluding 
legal remedies) for responding to the enactment of a No Funding provision. 
 
OPTION 1: STOP PERFORMING ABORTIONS 
 
If Planned Parenthood were to simply stop providing abortion services, the 
organization would no longer fall within the definition of a “prohibited entity” 
as defined in the No Funding provisions intended to defund Planned 
Parenthood.95 Thus, ceasing to perform abortions would allow Planned 
Parenthood to remain eligible to receive Medicaid and Title X reimbursements 
for its family planning services. But Planned Parenthood’s choice to take this 
action would undoubtedly impede abortion access, substantially affecting 
abortion rights. To that point, Planned Parenthood’s affiliated clinics currently 
provide just over one-third of all abortion services offered in the United States.96 
Furthermore, research indicates that other abortion providers would not be able 
 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 115–52, at 59–60 (2017). 
 93. Id. at 60. 
 94. Id. at 59. 
 95. See, e.g., American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(1) (2017) (defining a 
“prohibited entity” as one that, among other things, provides for abortions other than those allowed by the Hyde 
Amendment). 
 96. Compare Jones & Jerman, supra note 89, at 17 (“In 2014, an estimated 926,200 abortions were 
performed in the United States.”), with PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2014–2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, at 
30 (2015) (reporting that Planned Parenthood and its affiliates performed 323,999 abortions in 2014). 
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to meet the demand for abortion services if Planned Parenthood stopped 
providing abortion care.97 
Whole Woman’s Health provides a great reference point for analyzing 
whether the provision that threatens to defund Planned Parenthood would be 
unduly burdensome in the event that Planned Parenthood decides to stop 
performing abortions in order to remain eligible for Medicaid and Title X 
reimbursements for the provision of family planning services. In that case, the 
record indicated that the number of licensed abortion facilities declined from 
“more than 40” to “almost half [that amount] leading up to and in the wake of 
enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement” and that “[i]f the surgical-
center provision were allowed to take effect, the number of abortion facilities . . . 
would be reduced further, so that ‘only seven facilities and a potential eighth 
[would have] exist[ed] in Texas.’”98 
If Planned Parenthood were to respond to the No Funding provision by no 
longer providing abortion services, the burdens on abortion access would not be 
consistent across the country. Abortion access would be more severely burdened 
in states that have a greater number of Planned Parenthood clinics or where a 
greater proportion of the state’s abortion clinics are Planned Parenthood 
affiliates. 
For example, about seventy-six percent of California’s abortion service 
providers are Planned Parenthood clinics.99 Thus, if Planned Parenthood 
responds to the defunding threat by ceasing to provide abortions, California will 
experience an abortion clinic shut down rate of seventy-six percent. That shut-
down rate would far exceed the abortion clinic shut-down rate caused by Texas’s 
admitting-privileges requirement. Thus, the No Funding provision that defunds 
Planned Parenthood would unduly burden abortion access in California if 
Planned Parenthood responds to it by ceasing to perform abortions. 
In contrast, only twenty-five percent of Florida’s abortion clinics are 
Planned Parenthood clinics (22 out of 88).100 While the closure of one-quarter 
of Florida’s abortion clinics would arguably be substantial, it is unclear whether 
this would be deemed to impose an undue burden on Floridians because the 
Court, in Whole Woman’s Health, did not specify what constitutes an 
unacceptable percentage of clinic closure. We only know that a law that causes 
fifty percent or more abortion clinics to close is unduly burdensome. 
Moreover, the Court in Whole Women’s Health acknowledged and 
 
 97. Sara Rosenbaum, Planned Parenthood, Community Health Centers, and Women’s Health: Getting the 
Facts Right, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150902. 
050150/full. 
 98. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016) (quoting the findings of the lower 
court). 
 99. See infra text accompanying notes 104–105. 
 100. Compare Health Centers in Florida, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-center/fl (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (showing that there are twenty-
two Planned Parenthood clinics in Florida), with Jones & Jerman, supra note 89, at 23 (showing that there are 
eighty-eight abortion clinics in Florida). 
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included in their analysis the fact that the Texas law would have denied women 
abortion access because the remaining abortion providers would have been 
incapable of meeting the demand for abortion services.101 Here, too, the fact that 
remaining abortion providers will not be able to meet the demand for abortion 
services if Planned Parenthood stops performing abortions is significant.102 
 
OPTION 2: SEGREGATE ABORTION CARE FROM ITS OTHER SERVICES 
 
Instead of choosing not to provide any abortion care, Planned Parenthood 
could segregate its family planning and abortion services. Under this scheme, 
the clinics that provide only family planning services would not be “prohibited 
entities” as defined in the No Funding provision that would defund Planned 
Parenthood.103 Thus, those clinics would remain eligible to receive Medicaid 
and Title X reimbursements for their family planning services. Only the clinics 
that continue to provide abortion care would be exempted from receiving 
Medicaid and Title X reimbursements. 
Because this scenario would allow Planned Parenthood to provide some 
abortion services, the provision that defunds Planned Parenthood would burden 
abortion access to a lesser extent if Planned Parenthood segregated abortion care 
from its other services than it would if Planned Parenthood stopped providing 
abortions altogether. However, abortion access would still be burdened because 
the separation would necessarily result in fewer clinics offering abortion care. 
Further, the segregation would also impact contraceptive access due to the 
inability to offer family planning services at the clinics that perform abortions. 
In turn, the burden on contraceptive access would likely trigger a greater demand 
for abortion services, which abortion providers might not be able to meet given 
the already burdened structure. 
The burden imposed by a No Funding provision that defunds Planned 
Parenthood under a segregation scheme would also include increased driving 
distances for those seeking both abortion and contraceptive services and a 
disruption in the continuity of care. For example, consider the following 
hypothetical: A patient seeking abortion care could call her local Planned 
Parenthood clinic, where she had been receiving cancer screening and 
contraceptive services for years, only to find out that the clinic no longer offers 
abortion care due to the segregation of abortion and family planning services. 
 
 101. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 102. But how would the analysis in Whole Woman’s Health apply to a state that has so few abortion clinics 
that causing just one to shut down would amount to a fifty or one hundred percent shut down rate? There are 
currently six states that rely on a sole abortion provider: Kentucky, Mississippi, South Dakota, North Dakota, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Linley Sanders, Inside the States with One Abortion Clinic: Kentucky Fights for 
Its Last Provider in 2018, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/state-without-
abortion-clinic-kentucky-772692.  
 103. See American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017) (defining a “prohibited 
entity” as one that, among other things, provides for abortions other than those allowed by the Hyde 
Amendment). 
L - PATTON_13 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:36 AM 
December 2018]           HARRIS AND WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH COLLIDE 319 
She is informed that the nearest Planned Parenthood clinic offering abortions is 
twenty-five miles away in another town. 
The burden of not being able to receive abortion care in her hometown may 
be enough to prevent the patient from getting an abortion. After all, she may not 
have reliable transportation to get to an appointment in another town or may not 
be able to take the extra time off work needed to keep an appointment at a 
faraway clinic (considering the increased travel time). She might also feel less 
comfortable seeking abortion care from providers who are strangers to her than 
she would if she was able to get that same care in the clinic she has been visiting 
for years. And, even if the patient is successful in procuring abortion care from 
the faraway clinic, the provider who performed the abortion would not be able 
to prescribe contraceptives to prevent her from experiencing another unintended 
pregnancy. Instead, the patient would have to make yet another appointment 
with her local clinic. 
Women in states that have a greater number of Planned Parenthood clinics 
or where a greater proportion of the state’s abortion clinics were Planned 
Parenthood affiliates would be disparately affected by a provision that defunds 
Planned Parenthood under this scheme as well. On balance, if Planned 
Parenthood were to segregate its family planning and abortion services in 
California, a state that relies heavily on Planned Parenthood’s services, the state 
would experience an extreme reduction in the number of abortion service 
providers. There are one hundred and fifty-two abortion clinics in the State of 
California.104 One hundred and fifteen of these are Planned Parenthood 
clinics.105 In September 2017 a confidential informant told me that California’s 
Planned Parenthood affiliates considered the segregation option to be the best 
response to the proposed defunding provisions and had preliminarily anticipated 
that they would only be able to maintain thirty-three abortion-providing clinics 
if Planned Parenthood has to segregate its abortion and family planning services 
in California. Thus, the number of abortion service providers in the state of 
California was projected to decrease by fifty-six percent, from one-hundred and 
fifty-two abortion service providers to only seventy if Planned Parenthood is 
defunded, as of that time. 
The Court in Whole Woman’s Health found that Texas’s admitting-
privileges requirement placed an undue burden on abortion access because it 
caused the closure of “almost half” of Texas’s abortion clinics.106 Thus, where 
the 56% decrease in the number of abortion providers in California is greater 
than the abortion clinic shut-down rate caused by Texas’s admitting-privileges 
requirement, the provision that defunds Planned Parenthood would unduly 
burden abortion access in California if Planned Parenthood has to segregate its 
 
 104. Jones & Jerman, supra note 89, at 23. 
 105. Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California Applauds Court’s Decision on Birth Control Mandate, 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.ppactionca.org/news/ppac-applauds-court-decision-on-
birth-control-mandate-2.html. 
 106. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301. 
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abortion and family planning services in response to the No Funding provision. 
Additionally, my confidential informant reported that, under the 
segregation scheme, Planned Parenthood anticipates that most of its facilities 
that will provide abortion services in the state of California will be concentrated 
in urban areas, meaning that abortion seekers living in rural areas will likely 
have to travel significant distances to obtain abortion care. For example, the 
source disclosed that the organization anticipates that segregating its abortion 
and family planning services will leave the entire Central Valley without a single 
abortion clinic. 
To draw parallels from Whole Woman’s Health, the Court noted that if the 
Texas regulations were enacted, abortion facilities would “remain only in 
Houston, Austin, San Antonio, and the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan region” 
and that almost five million women would have lived more than fifty miles from 
an abortion provider (with many of these women living much farther away).107 
And, while the Court asserted that “[i]ncreased driving distances do not always 
constitute an ‘undue burden,’” they are “one additional burden, which, . . . lead 
us to conclude that the record adequately supports the District Court’s ‘undue 
burden’ conclusion.”108 
 
OPTION 3: TRY TO MAKE DO WITHOUT GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
 
Planned Parenthood could always choose to forego government funds. 
However, the loss of thirty-seven percent of its budget would be detrimental to 
Planned Parenthood, presumably resulting in a thirty-seven percent decrease in 
the quantity of services Planned Parenthood is able to provide.109 But which 
 
 107. Id. (quoting lower court’s findings). 
 108. Id. at 2313. 
 109. I concede that, there may not necessarily be a 1:1 correspondence between amount of funds cut and the 
amount of services provided. Indeed, Planned Parenthood may improve efficiency in the face of defunding, and 
many non-profits have received an influx in private donations since the November 2016 election. See, e.g., Rich 
Bellis, LGBTQ Nonprofits Got a Trump Bump Last Year, FAST CO. (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40510682/lgbtq-nonprofits-got-a-trump-bump-last-year (“[T]he combined 
revenues of 39 major U.S. LGBTQ nonprofits jumped 11% in fiscal 2016 . . . .”); Mike Scutari, It’s Official: 
Donald Trump Is the Best Thing That’s Ever Happened to Nonprofit Journalism, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (Mar. 
30, 2017), https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2017/3/30/trump-bump-an-vocal-opponents-
foundations-give-nonprofit-journalism-a-boost (“[T]he Center for Investigative Reporting, the Center for Public 
Integrity, and ProPublica received [huge donations] thanks to $12 million in new grants from First Look 
Media and Democracy Fund. . . . [which] came at a time when some wealthy donors felt deeply alarmed by a 
Republican president who had a contentious relationship with the truth.”); Alexandra Spychalsky, 7 Silver 
Linings for Non-Profits Since Donald Trump Was Elected, BUSTLE (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/7-
silver-linings-for-non-profits-since-donald-trump-was-elected-35896 (reporting, inter alia, that the ACLU 
received $24 million in donations—six times their annual budget—within two days of filing a lawsuit to 
halt Trump’s executive order restricting immigration from seven-majority Muslim nations and that Planned 
Parenthood received 80,000 donations “in just the first week after” the election (emphasis added)); 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2016–2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 2 (“Since November 2016, we have 
grown to more than 10 million supporters. More than 700,000 new donors have stepped up to support Planned 
Parenthood.”). Thus, it’s entirely possible that a financial attack on Planned Parenthood would be met with 
an even stronger show of support from private donors. 
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services would be reduced as a result of Planned Parenthood’s decision to forego 
funds? Because Planned Parenthood cannot receive funding for abortions, but 
only for family planning and other medical services, the decision to forego 
government funding would seem to mostly impact its provision of services that 
are unrelated to abortions. 
However, the loss of thirty-seven percent of Planned Parenthood’s funding 
would ultimately impede abortion access because the substantial loss of income 
would likely prompt many clinic closures, reducing the number of abortion 
service providers. Additionally, the reduction in family planning services would 
also likely result in an increase in unintended pregnancies, which would provoke 
a greater demand for abortion services and impact Planned Parenthood’s ability 
to meet the increased demand. The inverse relationship between contraceptive 
access and abortion rates is not just conjectural. Abortion rates dropped 13% 
between 2008 and 2011.110 One study found that the reason for the drop in 
abortion incidence was a decline in the number of unintended pregnancies (from 
fifty-one percent to forty-five percent).111 It further indicated that a rise in 
contraceptive use was partially responsible for the decline in unintended 
pregnancies during that time.112 
Another study examined the adverse effects of “the implementation of the 
2013 exclusion of Planned Parenthood affiliates from a Medicaid waiver 
program in Texas,” and concluded that it “was associated with adverse changes 
in the rates of provision and continuation of contraception and with increases in 
the rate of childbirth covered by Medicaid.”113 Unfortunately, the methodologies 
used in that study made it impossible to establish a link between the adverse 
changes in the rates of provision and continuation of contraception and the 
abortion rate. The information used in the study was derived from Medicaid 
billing records. Because Texas prohibits state funds from being used to pay for 
abortions, Medicaid billing records would not have revealed the abortion rate 
amongst Medicaid patients. However, the aforementioned study still supports 
the suggestion that the increase in unplanned pregnancies in Texas was likely 
accompanied by an increase in demand for abortions. 
Planned Parenthood has no good option in the face of defunding. Abortion 
access will be impeded no matter how Planned Parenthood responds to the threat 
and the impediment will be substantial because Planned Parenthood’s clinics 
perform roughly one-third of all abortions performed in the United States. Thus, 
the No Funding provision that would exclude Planned Parenthood from 
receiving Title X funding would unduly burden abortion access, albeit to varying 
degrees in different parts of the country. 
 
 110. Jones & Jerman, supra note 89, at 23. 
 111. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Changes in Use of Long-Acting Contraceptive Methods in the United States, 
2007–2009, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 893, 893–97 (2012). 
 112. Id. at 895. 
 113. Amanda J. Stevenson et al., Effect of Removal of Planned Parenthood from the Texas Women’s Health 
Program, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853, 860 (2016).  
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2. Application of the “Undue Burden” Standard to the Provisions that 
Prohibit the Subsidization of Abortion Care 
If enacted, the tax-related No Funding provisions contained within three of 
the four above-mentioned healthcare reform bills would ban abortion coverage 
from every state’s Marketplace as well as the federal Marketplace and prohibit 
the use of federal tax credits to offset the costs of maintaining any outside-the-
Marketplace plans that offer abortion coverage beyond the limitations of the 
Hyde Amendment.114 The provisions would also limit employer coverage of 
abortion by disqualifying small employers from receiving tax credits if their 
plans cover abortion beyond Hyde limitations.115 Under this scheme, there 
would be absolutely no government subsidization of any insurance plan that 
offered abortion coverage as a standard feature. Instead, women across the 
nation would have to purchase unsubsidized abortion riders to maintain abortion 
coverage and, again, abortion riders may not be readily available. 
Even if abortion riders are made available, they are an impractical option. 
Purchasing an abortion rider would, essentially, be pre-paying for an abortion 
that might never be needed:116 
The financial viability of an insurance product counts on the fact that a large pool 
of consumers will pay into the policy, spreading the risk, but that not everyone 
will use the services. Therefore, a separate policy offered in the individual market 
that covers one specific . . . procedure would typically be purchased by those 
[who] anticipate needing that coverage. As a result, the insurers would likely 
charge very high premiums for these supplemental policies in order to cover the 
costs associated with the lack of a diverse risk pool.117 
Further, women who purchase abortion riders would still end up paying 
most or all of their abortion costs due to deductibles, which, on average, exceed 
the costs of a typical abortion:118 
The cost of an abortion depends on many factors including gestation, anesthesia, 
procedure, and type of provider (clinic versus hospital or office-based). A clinic-
based abortion at 10 weeks’ gestation is estimated to cost between $400 and 
$550, whereas an abortion at 20 to 21 weeks’ gestation is estimated to cost $1,100 
 
 114. Compare Graham-Cassidy-Heller-Johnson Amendment, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017), and Better 
Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, S. 270, 115th Cong. (2017), and Obamacare Repeal Reconciliation Act of 
2017, 115th Cong. (2017), with Health Care Freedom Act of 2017, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 115. RANJI ET AL., supra note 88, at 9. 
 116. Indeed, only one in four women has an abortion. See Laurie Sobel et al., The Myth of the Abortion 
Insurance Rider, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 12, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20180703.31506/full. Thus, it would make more sense for reproductive-aged women to set aside 
emergency funds than to purchase abortion riders. This would allow women who experience unintended and 
unwelcome pregnancies to cash pay for abortion procedures and, in the event that no unintended pregnancy ever 
arises, to keep those funds (which otherwise would have been paid to an insurance provider and never seen 
again). I realize that healthy individuals who oppose the ACA’s individual mandate could make the same 
argument about insurance generally. However, an unanticipated trip to the emergency room could result in tens 
of thousands of dollars in medical bills whereas the cost of an abortion is much more manageable.  
 117. Rosenzweig et al., supra note 58, at 3. 
 118. See Sobel et al., supra note 116. 
L - PATTON_13 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:36 AM 
December 2018]           HARRIS AND WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH COLLIDE 323 
to $1,650 or more.119 
While abortion costs do not justify maintaining policies solely for abortion 
coverage, these costs are all too often daunting for low-income women trying to 
gather the funds needed to pay for abortions out-of-pocket. Proponents of the 
No Funding provisions are banking on the real possibility that many women will 
not be able to secure the necessary funds and will have to forego abortion care 
as a result. It is worth repeating that lack of funding is the number one barrier to 
abortion access, forcing one in four low-income women who would elect to have 
an abortion but for financial barriers to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.120 
While pro-choice advocates contend that the tax-related No Funding provisions 
were contrived solely to undermine abortion rights, proponents of these 
provisions assert other government interests as justification for the enactment of 
the provisions. 
 
PRONG 1—LEGITIMATE INTEREST 
 
Congress’ interests in enacting provisions that culminate in the exclusion 
of plans that cover abortions from all marketplaces are the same as those 
previously discussed with respect to the provision that defunds Planned 
Parenthood namely, (1) promoting women’s health, which is ostensibly 
impaired by the abortion experience; (2) protecting pro-life taxpayers from being 
forced to subsidize abortions; and (3) protecting the potentiality of human life. 
Again, the legitimacy of these interests as justifications for the enactment of the 
No Funding provisions that exclude plans that cover abortions from the 
subsidized market is wholly dependent on the validity of the fungibility 
argument. 
But the fungibility principle begins to collapse on itself with respect to a 
system under which individuals who purchase subsidized insurance plans are 
also allowed to purchase optional “unsubsidized” abortion “riders” because all 
money is fungible. Subsidizing the costs of maintaining health insurance “frees 
up” money that individuals can then use to purchase abortion riders. Applying 
the fungibility principle to its fullest extent, governments would need to either 
stop giving any money to anyone (which they cannot do as a practical matter) or 
else outlaw abortion (which they cannot do constitutionally) to prevent the 
subsidization of abortions. Thus, the fungibility principle just cannot be 
appropriately applied in this context. 
Additionally, the method of preventing governmental subsidization of 
Planned Parenthood’s operations by preventing Medicaid and Title X funds 
from going to Planned Parenthood by amending the Internal Revenue Service’s 
definition of “Qualified provider” so that Planned Parenthood no longer fits 
within that definition does not wholly prevent governmental subsidization of 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Restricting Medicaid Funding for Abortion Forces One in Four Poor Women to Carry Unwanted 
Pregnancies to Term, supra note 21.  
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Planned Parenthood’s operations. For example, the No Funding provisions do 
not revoke Planned Parenthood’s status as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization.121 
“Planned Parenthood . . . is a tax-exempt corporation under Internal Revenue 
Code section 501(c)(3) and . . . [c]ontributions are tax deductible to the fullest 
extent available under the law. Planned Parenthood affiliates have same tax 
status.”122 Therefore, even if the No Funding provisions are passed, taxpayers 
will still receive charitable deductions for donations made to Planned 
Parenthood, and Planned Parenthood can use those donations to provide 
abortions. Thus, by foregoing the tax revenue that would otherwise be collected 
on these transfers, the federal government can be viewed as subsidizing Planned 
Parenthood’s operations in the same way that making Medicaid and Title X 
distributions to Planned Parenthood theoretically does. 
Planned Parenthood receives thirty-six percent of its revenue from private 
donors via charitable gifts and bequests.123 Thus, the federal government 
foregoes substantial revenue by allowing charitable deductions for gifts to 
Planned Parenthood. This is a major loophole in the scheme to prevent 
governmental subsidization of Planned Parenthood. In fact, charitable 
deductions account for “the largest tax expenditure program in the federal 
transfer tax regime.”124 If the purpose of the No Funding provisions is to protect 
taxpayers from having to subsidize abortions, it seems odd that Planned 
Parenthood’s status as a “Qualified provider” is being targeted rather than its 
status as a non-profit organization.125 
 
 121. Section 501(c)(3) is the portion of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code that allows for federal tax exemption 
of nonprofit organizations, specifically those that are considered public charities, private foundations or private 
operating foundations. Transfers to 501(c)(3) corporations are also exempted from estate taxes and gift taxes. 
 122. PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2016–2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 34. 
 123. Id. at 33. 
 124. BRANT HELLWIG & ROBERT T. DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 313 (2d ed. 2013). 
 125. Exemption Requirements—501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501c3-organizations (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018) (“To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must 
be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its 
earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. In addition, it may not be an action organization, 
i.e., it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities and it may not participate in 
any campaign activity for or against political candidates.”). Some argue that Planned Parenthood’s lobbying, 
campaigning and other political activities should preclude it from enjoying the benefits of tax-exempt status. To 
be clear, Planned Parenthood is not a single entity. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. (Tax ID # 
13-1644147) (PPFA), the 501(c)(3) organization, provides educational and health care services relating to family 
planning, the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, cancer screening, and more. Contributions to that 
entity are tax-exempt. PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2016–2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 34. In contrast, 
Planned Parenthood’s politically active arm is a 501(c)(4) organization called Planned Parenthood Action Fund 
(PPAF); contributions to that entity are not tax-exempt. Id. This separation allows Planned Parenthood to engage 
in political activities while also retaining tax-exempt status for its non-political arm; however, some claim that 
Planned Parenthood’s tax returns indicate that the two Planned Parenthood entities commingle employees and 
funds. See, e.g., Memorandum from Chairman Jason Chaffetz to Republican Members of the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform 4–5 (Sept. 29, 2015), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Committee-Findings-Planned-Parenthood-Investigation.pdf (“Planned Parenthood has 
given the Planned Parenthood Action Fund $21,576,629 in grants. . . . [and] tax returns also indicate that both 
Planned Parenthood and its affiliates share employees, facilities, equipment, mailing lists, and other assets with 
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PRONG 2—SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE 
 
Even if a court finds that Congress does have a legitimate interest in 
enacting the No Funding provisions that mandate the exclusion of plans that 
cover abortions from all subsidized markets and deny tax credits to consumers 
who purchase such plans, those provisions may still unduly burden abortion 
access if they substantially burden abortion access.126 Although Harris stands 
for the proposition that funding restrictions do not substantially impede abortion 
access because they do not impede abortion access, the tax-related No Funding 
provisions go beyond simply denying government funds for abortions. They 
actually would impede abortion access by coercing private insurers into 
dropping abortion coverage as a standard feature from their plans in order to 
avoid exclusion from the subsidized insurance market, and coercing taxpayers—
both individuals and small group employers—into foregoing abortion coverage 
or unwittingly neglecting to purchase separate abortion coverage.127 
With respect to the coercion of private insurers, it is important to recognize 
the massive sales platform that the subsidized insurance market provides to 
insurers. Millions of Americans purchase health plans through the federal 
Marketplace each year.128 No insurer would want to be disqualified from the 
prospect of reaching such a large customer base. Thus, by mandating the 
exclusion of private plans that offer abortion coverage as a standard plan feature 
from the subsidized markets, the No Funding provisions compel private insurers 
to eliminate abortion coverage from their plans. Of course, the natural 
consequence of this would be a decline in the availability of abortion coverage, 
which would make abortion coverage harder to find—not just for those 
purchasing insurance through subsidized marketplaces, but for everyone. 
With respect to the coercion of taxpayers, mandating the exclusion of plans 
that offer abortion coverage as a standard feature from subsidized markets also 
 
[the lobbying arm].” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). If the comingling allegations are true, then an 
argument could be made that PPFA serves as a conduit for PPAF and should be stripped of its 501(c)(3) status 
according to the “conduit doctrine.” The conduit doctrine argument is similar to the fungibility argument but it 
seems, at least to me, factually provable and, therefore, better grounded than the fungibility argument. Moreover, 
revoking Planned Parenthood’s status as a non-profit organization would actually make it ineligible to receive 
Title X funds in the first place. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.3 (2017). Thus, revoking PPFA’s 501(c)(3) status would more 
comprehensively prevent the subsidization of abortions. However, the question as to whether PPFA is properly 
classified as a 501(c)(3) is outside the scope of this Note. 
 126. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 127. It is “rare” for individuals and small group employers to request abortion riders and “it is unclear how 
customers who purchase group insurance . . . learn about the abortion coverage option.” Peter Slevin, Insurers 
Report on Use of Abortion Riders, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/AR2010031302139.html. 
 128. Eight million Americans purchased health plans through the Marketplace in 2014, 11.7 million in 2015, 
and 12.7 million in 2016. New Analysis Suggests ACA Marketplace Enrollment Could Grow Modestly Over Next 
Few Years, up to 16.3 Million Sign-Ups, 14.7 Million Enrollees After Attrition, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/new-analysis-suggests-aca-marketplace-
enrollment-could-grow-modestly-over-next-few-years-up-to-16-3-million-sign-ups-14-7-million-enrollees-
after-attrition. 
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forces taxpayers into foregoing abortion coverage because many taxpayers can 
only afford to purchase health plans through the subsidized market and are 
required to maintain insurance in compliance with the individual mandate as 
long as the mandate remains in effect.129 
In concluding on the undue burden analysis, I resolve not only that 
Congress has not proffered a legitimate interest in enacting the No Funding 
provisions, but that the provisions would place a substantial obstacle in the paths 
of women seeking abortions. The pro-life movement cannot claim that the No 
Funding provisions only incidentally burden abortion access; they are TRAP 
laws because the purpose and the effect of No Funding provisions is to shut 
down the nation’s largest abortion provider and to make abortion coverage 
essentially nonexistent. Harris and Whole Woman’s Health become 
irreconcilable when the fungibility principle is applied in the context of abortion 
and the undue burden standard must be applied. 
B. EVEN IF THE NO FUNDING PROVISIONS ARE NOT UNDULY BURDENSOME, 
THEY VIOLATE THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
Even if the undue burden standard is not applied in this context, the No 
Funding provisions violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. This 
doctrine holds that even where “a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny the benefit for 
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may 
not rely. [A government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes constitutionally protected interests” because such a denial would 
“penalize[] and inhibit[]” the exercise of the constitutional right.130 
For example, a non-tenured public professor who worked for a state college 
“under a series of one-year contracts” challenged a decision not to renew his 
employment contract, alleging that the decision was inappropriately based on 
his criticism of the regents and the college president and was, therefore, a 
violation of his right to free speech.131 The Supreme Court held that a public 
employee’s “lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment, taken alone, 
[did not] defeat[] his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”132 Similarly, the fact that women are not entitled 
to government funds that may be needed to procure abortion services, taken 
alone, cannot defeat a claim that the denial of healthcare subsidies is 
inappropriately based on maintenance of insurance coverage for services that 
women have a constitutional right to access and, therefore, violates women’s 
liberty interest. 
Additionally, service providers like Planned Parenthood are not 
 
 129. Although the individual shared responsibility payment, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012), is a thing of the 
past, the individual mandate, technically, is still in effect. 
 130. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 131. Id. at 594. 
 132. Id. at 596. 
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circumscribed from invoking the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.133 “[T]he 
Supreme Court has expressly recognized constitutional protections for entities 
seeking federal contracts or funding so that they may provide various services 
to others.”134 Thus, Planned Parenthood could invoke the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine as an avenue of invalidating provisions that condition 
government funding for its family planning services on its abandonment of the 
provision of abortion services because such provisions penalize and inhibit the 
provision of services that women have a constitutional right to access. 
In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently 
reviewed an Ohio statute that was analogous to the AHCA’s No Funding 
provisions and held that the statute violated the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.135 The Ohio statute required the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) to 
ensure that all funds received through six non-abortion-related federal health 
programs were not used to contract with any entity that performs or promotes 
nontherapeutic abortions or was affiliated of with such an entity.136 Of course, 
Planned Parenthood stepped in to challenge this statute before it went into effect, 
filing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137 
Planned Parenthood alleged that the Ohio statute violated its First 
Amendment rights by denying it state and federal funds “because of—and in 
retaliation for—their constitutionally protected advocacy for abortion rights and 
affiliation with other organizations that also advocate for abortion rights and/or 
 
 133. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976) (“[I]t generally is appropriate to allow a 
physician to assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion 
decision . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (physicians who 
supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood had standing to challenge constitutionality of Missouri statute); 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Himes, 888 F.3d 224, 230–31 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A]bortion providers 
have standing to enforce their patients’ abortion rights.”), vacated by and reh’g, en banc, granted by 892 F.3d 
1283 (6th Cir. 2018); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 828 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 
2016) (“‘[B]ecause abortion is a medical procedure . . . the full vindication of the woman’s fundamental right 
necessarily requires that her’ medical provider be allowed the right to ‘make his best medical judgment,’ 
including ‘implementing [her decision] should she choose to have an abortion.’”) (quoting City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Casey, 505 
U.S. at 870); Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[S]tanding of the 
physician plaintiffs, and of Planned Parenthood as the owner of abortion clinics in Wisconsin, to maintain this 
suit is not open to question.”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 
1390, 1396 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that Planned Parenthood and its Medical Director had standing to assert 
third-party rights of women as well as their own rights). 
 134. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.C. v. Cansler, 877 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321 (M.D.N.C. 2012); see also 
O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 713, 725–26 (1996) (recognizing First Amendment 
protections for a private towing service seeking to maintain government contracts to provide towing services to 
the community); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686 (1996) (recognizing First Amendment 
protections for an independent contractor who provided trash hauling services and was seeking to maintain his 
government contracts to continue providing those services); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991) 
(addressing First Amendment challenges by a group of plaintiffs that included providers of family planning 
services seeking to continue providing such services). 
 135. Himes, 888 F.3d at 248.  
 136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.034 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 137. Himes, 888 F.3d at 227. 
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provide abortion services.”138 Planned Parenthood also alleged that the statute 
violated the Due Process Clause by denying state and federal funds to women 
because of—and in retaliation for—their own constitutionally protected right to 
choose to have abortion.139 The court seemed to agree, stating that the Ohio 
statute was “unnecessary to accomplish Ohio’s choices to favor childbirth and 
refrain from subsidizing abortions,”140 and that “if the government cannot 
directly prohibit [Planned Parenthood] from providing and advocating for 
abortion on their own time and dime, it may not do so by excluding them from 
government programs for which they otherwise qualify and which have nothing 
to do with the government’s choice to disfavor abortion.”141 
While this decision supports the notion that the AHCA’s No Funding 
provisions would similarly violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the 
Sixth Circuit subsequently granted a rehearing en banc, which effectively 
vacated the decision and stayed the mandate pending appeal.142 Moreover, we 
do not know how the increasingly right-leaning Supreme Court would decide on 
the issue. Thus, the saga continues. 
CONCLUSION 
There will likely be continued efforts to restrict abortion coverage. If 
enacted, the proposed No Funding provisions would threaten women’s social 
and economic progress comprehensively assaulting reproductive freedom; after 
all, they would impede access to both contraceptives and abortions. The No 
Funding provisions would impede contraceptive access by defunding Planned 
Parenthood, a major provider of family planning services and often the only 
provider of family planning services available to low-income women in rural 
areas. The obvious result will be an increase in unintended pregnancies and, 
consequently, demand for abortion services. Of course, this will only compound 
the abortion access problems that the No Funding provisions will instigate. 
With respect to the impediment of abortion access, the attack comes in two 
forms. First, the No Funding provisions would force clinic closures by defunding 
the nation’s preeminent abortion provider. And, second, they would prevent all 
women, not just poor women receiving insurance subsidies, from securing 
abortion coverage by coercing private insurers to eliminate abortion coverage as 
a standard feature of their insurance plans. While proponents of the No Funding 
provisions assert that women can still purchase optional unsubsidized abortion 
coverage, the reality is that abortion “riders” are an impractical option and aren’t 
likely to be available anyway. 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 233. 
 141. Id. at 239. 
 142. Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Himes, 892 F.3d 1283 (6th Cir. 2018). Under Sixth Circuit Rule 
35(b), “[a] decision to grant rehearing en banc vacates the previous opinion and judgment of the court, stays the 
mandate, and restores the case on the docket as a pending appeal.” 6TH CIR. R. 35(b). 
L - PATTON_13 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:36 AM 
December 2018]           HARRIS AND WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH COLLIDE 329 
The undue burden standard must be applied to impose some limit on the 
extent of funding restrictions. After all, the freedom to choose has little meaning 
when women cannot obtain abortion care due to abortion clinic closures, attacks 
on entities that help low-income individuals pay for abortions (given the lack of 
government funding for abortions), and a lack of available insurance coverage 
of abortion care. The No Funding provisions do not leave much room for choice, 
only a lack of options. In the alternative, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, which safeguards individuals and organizations from governmental 
attempts to penalize and obstruct the exercise of constitutional rights, could be 
applied to protect reproductive rights in any review of the No Funding 
provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L - PATTON_13 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:36 AM 
330 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:297 
*** 
 
 
